PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ALTERATIONS.
In Bank of Herington v. Wangerin, 70 Pac. 330, the

Supreme Court of Kansas discusses the conflict in the cases
upon the subject of alterations of. negotiable
Liability .1

instruments and holds that where a negotiable
instrument, is delivered to a payee, complete in
all its parts, the maker thereof is not liable thereon, even to
an innoceht holder, after the same has been fraudulently
altered so as to express a larger amount than was written
therein at the time of its execution. Nor, it is said, is such
maker bound at his peril to guard against the commission
of such forged alteration by one into whose hands such instrument may come. But see Brown v. Reed, 79 Pa. 370,
and compare Bank v. Burns, 129 Mass. 596.
naker of
Note

ATTORNEYS.

An attorney at law representing a party having a case
pending in court became ill, and was unable to attend. With
the consent of his client he called on another
Right to
Compensation

lawyer to argue the case, but nothing was said

about compensation for his services. There was a written
contract between the attorney first mentioned and the client,
by the terms of which it was agreed that the former should
conduct the litigation for a stipulated fee. Of this contract
the counsel appearing in court had no knowledge. In an
action against the client for compensation by the counsel
representing him, the Supreme Court of Kansas holds in
Allen v. Parrish,70 Pac. 351, that the written contract was
inadmissible in evidence on behalf of the defendant, and
that the right to recover for services could not be affected
by an understanding between the first attorney and the
client that the attorney appearing would do so- without
charge. See Brigham v. Foster, 7 Allen, 419.
-
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BANKS.

In an action against a bank to recover damages for its
wrongful refusal to honor a depositor's check, the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky holds that the plaintiff,
Dishonor of
Check,
who at the time her check was dishonored was
Damages
pursuing a special study in a strange city, may
recover for any time she lost or any expenses she incurred,
or for any loss of credit, of business, or of instruction that
she sustained, by reason of the dishonor of the check; but
only compensatory damages are to be allowed and she may
not recover for humiliation or mortification of feelings:
American National Bank v. Morey, 69 S. W. 759. And
also the fact that the plaintiff had a nervous chill when her
check was protested and returned to her is not to be considered in estimating the damage, as the chill was not such
a thing as should reasonably have been anticipated from
persons of ordinary health and strength. On the other
hand it is said: "There is something more than a breach
of contract in such cases; there is a question of public policy
involved, as was said in Bank v. Mason, 95 Pa. 113, 40 Am.

Rep. 632; and a breach of the implied contract between the
bank and its depositor entitles the latter to recover substantial damages."

CANCELLATION OF DEED.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Call v. Shewmaker, 69 S. W. 749, that a grantor seeking a cancellation of his deed on the ground that it was procured
by fraud, and also on the ground that it was
Return of
Consideration inconsistent with the provisions of the will under which the land was held, need not tender back the consideration received, as the defendants had for many years
had the use of the land, which even for a year was worth
much more than the whole consideration given, they having
in consequence received rents amounting to more than such
consideration.
A similar late decision is made by the Supreme Court of
Illinois in Taft v. Myerscough, 64 N. E. 711, where it is
held that where the consideration for a note is entirely worth.less corporate stock, it is not necessary for the maker to
offer to return the same in order to maintain the defence
of total failure of consideration.
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CARRIERS.

In Myers v. Southern Ry. Co., 42 S. E. 598, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina holds that where a passenger
Limited
bought a limited ticket, but missed the connectTicket
ing train at a junction, and took the next train
after the time limit had expired, there is sufficient evidence
to go to the jury on the question of exemplary damages,
where the conductor, after full explanation, collected fare
on threats of expulsion.
In Kentucky it is provided by statute that all railroad
companies shall open their ticket offices and waiting rooms
for the passengers at least thirty minutes preProtection
of
ceding the schedule time for the departure of
Passengers
all passenger trains. The similarity of statutes
of other states to this one makes the holding of the Court
of Appeals in Kentucy in Illinois CentralRailroadv. Laloge,
69 S. W: 795, of more than local interest. It is there decided that such a statute fixes what is a reasonable time for
the carrier to be required to care for passengers before they
have taken actual passage, and, therefore, where the plaintiff
was assaulted in the waiting room of the station about three
hours before the schedule time for the departure of the
train upon which she proposed to take passage, the company
was not liable in the absence of any contract, express or
implied, to accommodate her for a longer time than that
fixed by statute. Compare Phillips v. Railway Co., 124
N. C. 123.
CHECKS.

In a cash sale of cotton the seller accepted the buyer's
check in payment. The buyer sold a part of it to a third
Action by
party, drawing his draft on him for the payHolder
ment, and depositing it, with the bill of lading,
to his credit in the bank on which the check was drawn.
The bank credited the draft to the buyer's-account, and
honored checks drawn by him, until his credit was reduced
below the amount of the check held by the seller, without
knowledge that he had bought the cotton on an agreement
to pay cash. Under these facts the Supreme Court of North
Carolina holds in Perryv. Bank of Smithfield, 42 S. E. 551,
that the seller could not maintain an action against the bank
for the purchase money. See Finch v. Gregg, 126 N. C.
176. One judge dissents, but unfortunately writes no dissenting opinion.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The questions arising under the clause of the Constitution forbidding any state to deprive a person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, furnish
Regulating
Hours of
the most interesting problems in modern conEmployment stitutional law, with the exception, perhaps, of
the questions arising out of the relations of the United
States with its insular possessions. In State v. Buchanan,
7o Pac. 52, the contention was made that the state law there
in question interfered with the liberty of contract, but the
'Supreme Court of Washington holds that an act providing
that no female shall be employed in certain business establishments more than -ten hours in a day does not violate this
constitutional provision, but is within the police power of the
state. Compare on the other hand In re Morgan, 26 Colo.
415, and see Holdeii v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366.
In United States v. Blasingame, 116 Fed. 654, the U. S.
District Court (S. D., California) holds that a provision of
an appropriation act, making it a crime to vioDelegation
of Legislative

late any rule or regulation thereafter to be made

by the Secretary of the Interior for the protection of forest reservations, is void, as in substance-and effect
an attempt to delegate legislative power to an administrative
officer. Compare the principles laid down in Field v. Clark,
143 U. S. 649, and In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, though
the decision reached held that there had been no delegation
of legislative power.
Power

CONTEMPT.

Readers of the REGISTER are already familiar from the
newspaper accounts with the strong stand taken by the U. S.
Circuit Court in West Virginia in reference to
Applying
Abusive
the action of the miners in that district during
Epithe. t. the recent coal strike. A case growing out of
Judge
this situation is the case of United States v.
Gehr, 116 Fed. 520, where it is held that a man who came
into a federal district from a distant state for the purpose
of inciting a strike among miners, and who there publicly
denounced the judge of the district for his official action in
granting an injunction, using abusive language, and applying opprobrious epithets to him personally is guilty of a contempt of court.
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CONTRACTS.

In Arnold v. Arnold, 70 Pac. 23, it appeared that the
plaintiff alleged that he and the defendant having been partConsIderation, ners, the plaintiff transferred his interest solely
ParolEvidence that the defendant might conveniently handle
the business, and the prayer was for a dissolution and an
accounting. The defence was that there had been a dissolution and transfer for value. The plaintiff had introduced a
written instrument between him and the defendant reciting
a dissolution and a transfer for value. Notwithstanding the
general rule that the true consideration or want of consideration may be shown by parol, the Supreme Court of California holds it proper not to allow the plaintiff to testify
that the instrument was without consideration. The evidence, it is said, was not admissible on the theory that the
consideration might be shown by parol, owing to the confidential relation of partnership, no unfairness or suppression
of knowiedge being averred. Compare Hendrick v. Crowley, 31 Cal. 472.

In New v. Southern Ry. Co., 42 S. E. 391, it is held by
the Supreme Court of Georgia that a contract whereby a
Servcs of

father hires his minor son to another, and re-

leases him from all liability for "damages for
any injuries sustained" by the son while in the employer's
service will, when such contract can, under the facts of a
case arising thereunder, be properly treated as valid and
binding, defeat a recovery by the father for the loss of the
value of the son's services during minority, even where such
loss is occasioned by the homicide of the minor. And further such a contract, though made with a railroad company,
is valid and binding to the extent of exempting the latter
from liability for negligent acts of itself or servants which
are not criminal. It seems hardly in line with the trend of
authority to hold that a stipulation, as above, includes injuries due to negligence.
Son., Validity

CORPORATE ASSETS.

In Henderson v Hall, 32 Southern, 840, the Supreme
Court of Alabama holds that where stock subscribers to a
Jurisdiction corporation, intending to defraud the corporaof Equity
tion and hinder its creditors, sold their stock to
a nonresident, not believing, and having no reason to believe,
that the buyer was able to perform his promise to pay the
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CORPORATE ASSETS (Continued).

subscription notes, a judgment creditor of the corporation
has no standing in equity to compel the original subscribers
to pay their subscription notes. The creditor, it is said,
should proceed at law by garnishment.

CORPORATIONS.

Although a contract for the sale of shares of stock cannot be specifically enforced (Cud v. Rutter, I Peere Wins.
57o), the Supreme Court of Georgia holds in
.Purchase o
stock,
Thornton v. Martin, 42 S. E. 348, that where
Equitable
one purchases shares of stock in a railroad comJurisdiction
pany, and the vendor and the agents of the company refuse to recognize the validity of the sale or to allow
a transfer on the books of the company, the purchaser may
bring an equitable proceeding against the vendor and the
company to restain the former from disposing of the stock
or interfering with its transfer, and to compel the company
to make the transfer and receive the purchaser as a shareholder; and these two causes of action, the one against the
company and the other against the vendor, may be joined.

DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP.

The question of diversity of citizenship in its relation to
federal jurisdiction presents some interesting questions
Action by
when one of the parties sues or is sued in a
Guardian
representative capacity. Under the statutes of
Iowa the appointment of a guardian for a minor or an insane
person does not vest the guardian with title to the property
of his ward or to a cause of action existing in his favor, but
only with the right to manage and control the ward's property, and to prosecute actions in his behalf and for his benefit. In consequence it is held in Wilcoxen v. Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co., Ii6 Fed. 444, that in an action brought by a
guardian for an insane person appointed by a court of Iowa,
the ward is the real party plaintiff, and his citizenship, and
not that of the guardian controls with respect to the jurisdiction of a federal court or the right of removal. See notes
to Shipp v. Williams, io C. C. A. 249; Mason v. Dullag.ham, 27 C. C. A. 298.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The Supreme Court of California holds in Henley v.
Wilson, 70 Pac. 21, that the husband's liability for the torts
of his wife, not done by means of, or in the use
Torts of Wife
of, or in the assertion of some right in reference
to, her separate property, is not changed by the fact that
under the statutes she may have a separate estate and may
manage it. "It matters not what was the origin of the common law doctrine; its rule is settled and exists independently
of the grounds on which it originally rested." See Van
Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 312.
In Johnston v. Gulledge, 45 S. E. 354, the Supreme Court
of Georgia holds that if a promissory note, owned by a wife,
Note for
is given in pledge to secure a debt which is in
Husband's
part that of the wife and in part that of the husDebt
band, and such parts are readily ascertainable,
though it be invalid as to the part of the debt due by the
husband, the pledge is valid as to, the part of the debt which
is due by the wife, and the pledgee is entitled, when the note
is due, to recover from the maker. Compare Jones v.
Harrell, I IO Ga. 373, where a married woman signed a note
to cover partly her own and partly her husband's debt, and
the court made a similar decision.
INJUNCTION.

The general principle that equity will ordinarily not compel specific performance of a continuing contract or of one
Restraining

Water

company from

Sh

rtg
off

Water

for personal services is held by the Supreme

Court of Georgia not to apply to the state of
facts, presented by Edwards v. Milledgeville
Water Co.,

42

S. E. 417.

In that case it is

decided that where a petition for an injunction
against a company owning and operating a system of waterworks showed that the defendant and the plaintiff entered
into a contract by the terms of which the plaintiff was to
bear the entire expense of the material and labor necessary
to conduct water from the company's main to his residence,
as well as the cost of the necessary plugs, faucets, etc., and
to pay the company a stated amount per annum for the use
of the water, and the company on its part was to furnish him
with the water during a term of years, which still extended
far into the future; that the plaintiff had expended a large
sum of money in having a pipe laid from the company's
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nearest water main to his residence, and all the connections
made, and faucets placed, and had for several years been
using the water, and paying "his water rental promptly;"
that the company had lately notified him that, unless he
made with it a new contract, agreeing to pay a much larger
sum annually for the use of the water, it would sever the
connection between its main and his private pipe, thereby
depriving him of the use of the water,-a case was stated
for the grant of an injunction prohibiting the defendant
from executing his threat. See, also, Callery v. Waterworks
Co., 35 La. Ann. 798.
The converse of the famous case of Lumley v. Wagner,
I De C. McN. & G. 6o4 (followed by Daly v. Smith, 49
Against
Employing

Others

How Pr. 15o, and other cases), appears in

Stone Cleaning and Pointing Union v. Russell,
77 N. Y. Supp. lO49, where it is held that an

injunction will not lie to restrain a breach of contract to
employ only members of a certain stone cleaners' and pointers' union, since the employment is not unique or extraordinary. The novelty of the attempt to restrain the employer
instead of the employe is commented on by the court, it being
pointed out that the plaintiff's attorney fails to cite a single
case restraining an employer, and then it is held that the
distinction applicable where an injunction is sought against
the employe holds against the employer.
INSANITY.

The Supreme Court of Florida in Davis v. State, 32
Southern, 822, enters into a careful discussion of insanity
Irresistible 'as a defence to crime. The rule laid down in
Impulse

McNaghten's Case, io Clark & F. 29o-211, is

approved, and it is held that the tendency of some modem
courts to recognize that phase of insanity known as "irresistible impulse," as a defence, should not be favored and
will not be supported in that court.
JUDGMENTS.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Holstein
v. Board of Com'rs of Edgefield Co., 42 S. E. 18o, that
,conclusiveness

where the United States Circuit Court declares

a statute authorizing townships to subscribe
bonds in aid of a railroad constitutional, the Supreme Court
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of the state will give full credit to such judgment, and
refuse to enjoin the corporate authorities of such township
from carrying into effect such judgment, though such court
had previously declared similar acts unconstitutional. The
decision is based upon the theory that such a holding is
required by the section of the Constitution providing that
"full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state :"
McCullough v. Hicks, 63 S. C. 542, having held that this
constitutional provision is applicable to the judgment of a
circuit court of the United States.
NAVIGABLE WATERS.

In McCauley v. City 'of Philadelphia, 116 Fed. 438, the
U. S. District Court (E. D., Pennsylvania) holds that a city,
Obstructions; although charged by statute with the duty of
keeping the channels of navigable streams
Liabilityof
within its limits free from obstructions, cannot
city
be held liable for injuries caused by a sunken wreck, where
the owners had contracted with a wrecking company to
raise the vessel, and the company was prosecuting the work
with diligence, using such appliances as were in common
use for the purpose, and apparently, even in the opinion of
experts; with prospect of success, although the attempt
ultimately resulted in failure. The city's duty, it is said,
was "to watch the work that was being done, and to use due
care to see that it was prosecuted with diligence and with
proper appliances."
NUISANCE.

In Duffy v. E. H. & I. A. Meadows Co., 42 S. E. 46o,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, dealing with the
question of the degree of inconvenience sufficient
Offensive
Odors
to justify a nuisance, holds that a guano manufactory, though it may largely use undeodorized decayed
fish in its processes is not a nuisance per se, unless it is so
situated as to affect the health or comfort of the community
by means of its odors. The fact that odors carried a great
distance by the wind are "unpleasant and objectionable" is
not sufficient ground for interference by the court with the
establishment from which they arise.
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PARTTIS.

A complaint in partition made the judge of the Superior
Court a party defendant, and alleged that he claimed to have
Joning.Judge
in order to
Disqualify
Him

some interest in the land, but that he had no
interest therein. After service of the summons

on the judge, without answering or appearing in
the cause, he, of his own motion, and without

notice to any party, caused an order to be made and entered
striking the complaint from the files, reciting that the allegations therein as to him were false, deceitful, and abusive
of the process of the court, and made for the sole purpose of
disqualifying him in the trial of the action. Under these
facts the Supreme Court of California holds in Younger v.
Superior Court of Santa Cruz, 69 Pac. 485, that since a
judge should not sit or act in an action to which he is a
party, or in which he is interested, he could not thus arbitrarily determine that he was not a party and not interested
in the action, even if the plaintiff was guilty of contempt
in making the judge a party for the purpose of disqualifying
him. See a thorough discussion of the question of striking
a pleading from the files as a punishment for contempt in
Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S.409.
PARTNERSIP.

In Moorhead v. Seymour, 77 N. Y. Supp. IO5O, the affidavit in relation to the constitution of a special partner in a
Contribu'tion certain firm declared that his contribution had
by specai
been actually and in good faith paid in cash.
Partner
It appeared that the "cash" was "paid" in the
following way: The firm obtained money from a third person giving him its note therefor; it then gave the special
partner its check, and he gave it back his check for a like
amount, and thereupon a large part of the money was paid
back to the-person from whom the firm obtained it. The
City Court of New York holds that under these facts the
special partner has made no contribution of capital.
The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Bass Dry Goods
Co. v. Granite City Mfg. Co., 42 S.E. 415, that the surviving
Dissolution
by Death

partner or partners have the right, under the

law, to wind up the partnership affairs; and if,
in so doing one partner, acting as a surviving partner and
traveling salesman, sells to a third person, goods which have
already been sold by a resident surviving partner, and which
for this reason, cannot be delivered, neither the partnership
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assets nor the estate of the deceased partner can be held
liable for the failure to deliver the goods tothe purchaser
from the traveling partner.
PLEDGES.

In Colton v. Oakland Bank of Savings, 70 Pac. 225, the
Supreme Court of California holds that where B. pledged
Converslon, stock to A., and A. pledged it to C., and B.
Asslgnment treated it as a conversion, and put in a claim for
the value of the stock against A.'s assignee, he cannot recover the value of the stock of C. on the theory that B.'s
title was not effectually pledged by A. to C., but any right
to recover is on the assumption that A. converted the stock
by his pledge thereof, and thus, in connection with the payments to B., his title was acquired by the assignee.
PRESUMPTIONS.

In Kane v. Rochester Ry. Co., 77 N. Y. Supp. 776, the
N. Y. Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Fourth DepartFallureto
ment) holds that where the evidence in an
Introduce
action for personal injuries shows that an
Evidence
alleged injury is not apparent from objective
symptoms, but will be disclosed by an X-ray examination,
and the plaintiff introduces a physician who testifies that he
made such examination, but fails to show the result thereof,
the defendant is entitled to an instruction that the jury may
assume that the testimony of the witness, if given, would
have been adverse to the plaintiff, even though the fact of
such examination was called out by the defendant, who could
lave examined the witness as to the result of the examination.
RAILROADS.

The U. S. Circuit Court (N. D., Iowa) holds in O'Brien
v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., that a state, through- whose legisAbrogation of lative consent alone a railroad company derives
Fellowthe right to construct and operate a railroad
servant Rule within its territory, may attach to such consent
conditions for the protection of the lives and property of
those who may be subjected to risk through the operations
of such roads, and as one of such conditions it may lawfully
abrogate as to railroad companies, by a general law applicable to all companies operating roads within the state, the
common-law rule which exempts a master from liability for
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injuries resulting from the negligence of fellow-servants.
Compare Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.
Co., 175 U. S. 91.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Against the dissent of two judges, the Supreme Court of
Kansas holds in Missouri, etc. Ry. Co. v. Bagley, 69 Pac.
Pleading,
189, that where the original petition states no
Amendment
cause of action whatever, it will not arrest the
running. of the statute of limitations, and an amendment
made after the bar of the statute is complete must be treated
as filed at the time -the amendment is made. A cause of
action, being then stated for the first time, cannot escape the
bar of the statute of limitations by being filed as an amendment. Compare with this result Coffin v. Cottle, 16 Pick.
383 and Webb v. Hicks, 125 N. C. 201, cited by the dissenting judges as opposed to the view of the majority.
SURETY.

The Court of Appeals at Kansas City, Mo., holds in
Springfield Lighting Co. v. Hobart, 68 S. W. 942, that
Uability,
where a surety executed a bond, conditioned
DIscharge
that his principal would faithfully fulfill a certain contract whereby it agreed to furnish power for an
electric light company to operate its apparatus, and afterwards the electric light company was consolidated with
another company, and a new corporation formed, the surety
continued liable to the new corporation for the performance
of the contract.
TRIAL.

With one judge dissenting (judge Acheson)' the U. S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, holds in Carstairsv.
American Bonding and Trust Co. of Baltimore,
'Reserved
Question of
116 Fed. 449, that under the Pennsylvania pracLaw
tice a reservation of "the question whether there
is any evidence to go to the jury in support of the plaintiff's
claim" is a good reservation of a question of law; and the entering of judgment for the defendant on such reserved point,
notwithstanding a verdict for the plaintiff, is within the province of the court, being practically equivalent to the direction
of a verdict. The dissenting judge regards this procedure an
"unwarrantable departure from the constitutional provision"
that in certain cases trial shall be by jury.

